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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Notice of Appeal does designate "all preceding or interim orders"
giving notice that the court's ruling on summary judgment is being appealed. Further,
any interim order, involving the merits, can be challenged on appeal without being
specifically designated in the notice of appeal. Speros v. Fricke, 98 P.3d 28 (Utah 2004).
There are numerous issues of fact in this case regarding the denial of
Plaintiffs insurance claim based on arson, and the Insurance Company's failure to
investigate the facts. When an insured's claim is denied based on arson and issues of fact
are present, the question as to whether the denial was "fairly debatable" at the time, or in
"good faith," is for the jury to determine. Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Inc. Co., 909
P.2d 1279 (Ut.App. 1996).
Insurance policies are contracts for the payment of money when an
unexpected loss occurs, therefore Utah courts have held that the issuance of an insurance
policy for the loss, and the receipt of premiums on the policy, establishes the prima facie
liability of the insurance company. Fox v. Allstate Insurance Co., 453 P.2d 701, 706
(Utah 1969); Peterson v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 425 P.2d 769 (Utah 1976).
Insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and should be construed against
the insurance company, allowing coverage in the broadest sense possible. When
exceptions are contained in an insurance policy, the presumption is that that which is not
clearly excluded, is included. LDS Hospital, Division of Intermountain Healthcare, Inc.

1

v. Capitol Life Ins. Co,, 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988).
The determination as to whether a fire is "accidental" under an insurance
policy is not dependent on expert testimony regarding the cause of the fire, but rather
whether from the insured's point of view, the fire was foreseeable as a natural and
probable result of the insured*s own actions. Hoffman v. Life Ins, Co, of North America,
669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983); Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202, 1206
(Ut.App. 1997). Therefore, expert testimony was not necessary in this case, to put on
evidence that the fire was "accidental" for coverage under the insurance policy.
Furthermore, when the cause and origin of a fire is at issue in a case, a party
is not required to put on expert testimony, in order to present an issue of fact for the jury
to determine whether or not the fire was accidental. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 2006 P.3d (2006 Ut. App. 500). Failure to use an expert to establish causation
does not result in a directed verdict. Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Ut.App. 2002).
Plaintiffs expert was properly designated as a witness for Plaintiffs case,
and not merely as a rebuttal witness. Plaintiffs intent to use the witness in rebuttal, does
not preclude her from calling him on her case. The two are not mutually exclusive. The
court was aware that Plaintiff intended to call her expert before resting her case; and told
Plaintiff that her expert could testify on her case at noon the following day. The court
abused its discretion in not allowing Plaintiffs expert to testify the next day, and ruling
on Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict before the close of Plaintiff s case.

2

On a motion for directed verdict the moving party has the very difficult
burden of showing that the party with the burden of proof has failed to raise any questions
of material fact; and the court should deny the motion, when any evidence exists raising
such a question, no matter how improbable the evidence may appear. A Ita Health
Strategies, Inc., v. CCIMechanical Serv., 930 P.2d 284 (Ut.App. 1996). The Plaintiff
through her testimony, the testimony of her witnesses, as well as, the cross examination of
Defendant's witnesses, and admitted exhibits, presented evidence raising questions of
material fact, as to whether the fire was "accidental" under her insurance policy.
The court improperly dismissed Plaintiffs case in the middle of a jury trial
relying on Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court did not just
erroneously refer to Rule 41(b), but weighing the evidence, determined it was insufficient
without expert testimony, to establish the fire was "accidental" under the insurance
policy. The Defendant tried to change this reference in its preparation of the Judgment;
however, it is the substance of a motion that is dispositive in determining its character.
Adoption ofBaby K, 967 P.2d 947, 948 n. 1 (Ut.App. 1998). It was improper for the trial
judge to dismiss the jury trial based on the weight of the evidence under Rule 41(b).
I.

THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS SUFFICIENT TO APPEAL
THE COURT'S PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RULING.
The Notice of Appeal in this case references the Judgment on Directed

Verdict, entered on December 7, 2006, as well as, "allpreceding or interim orders."
(Rec. 1296). Therefore, the Notice of Appeal is sufficient in this case and gives the
3

Defendant notice that all preceding or interim orders, including the ruling on partial
summary judgment, are being appealed.
The notice of appeal in Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d
474 (Utah 1999), is distinguishable from the Notice of Appeal in this case. In Jensen the
notice of appeal was only from the jury verdict entered on July 14, 1995 and the denial of
certain post-judgment motions. Jensen failed to indicate in his notice, that he was
appealing any other orders entered by the court. Moreover the jury verdict entered in the
Jensen case dealt with a totally separate issue than the earlier summary judgment motion,
which involved other third-party defendants.1 The Court in Jensen was concerned that
the notice of appeal from the jury's verdict, which involved separate issues, failed to give
adequate notice to Intermountain that there was also an appeal from the earlier summary
judgment ruling; and as a result, Intermountain did not proceed with cross appeals against
the third-party defendants involved, but dismissed years earlier by the court on summary
judgment. Id. at 446.
The Notice of Appeal in this case however, clearly indicates that an appeal
is being taken, not only from the Judgment on Directed Verdict entered on December 21,
2006, but from "allpreceding and interim orders^ (Rec. 1296). This would include the
court's ruling on the partial summary judgment, dismissing a portion of Plaintiff s claims.

1

The summary judgment in Jensen dealt with Jensen's storage easements and
water rights, and included cross-claims against third-party defendants; while the jury trial
dealt solely with flooding issues against Intermountain Power Agency.
4

Furthermore, after Jensen v. Intermountain, in Speros v. Fricke, 98 P.3d 28
(Utah 2004), the Utah Supreme Court stated that Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure does not require an appellant to indicate that the appeal also concerns
intermediate orders or events that have led to the final judgment. Id., citing Zion 's First
National Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irr. Inc., 931 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1977); Scudderv.
Kennecott Copper Inc., 886 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1994).
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court in Speros v. Fricke, limited the holding
in Jensen v. Intermountain, to the fact that the appellee was unjustly prejudiced by the
appellant's failure to designated earlier matters decided on summary judgment, because it
deprived the appellee of the opportunity, "to proceed with cross-appeals against the thirdparty defendants involved, whom the court dismissed years earlier by granting summary
judgment." Speros v. Fricke, supra, footnote 2.2
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that a party seeking to appeal a
non-final summary judgment decision does not need to specifically identify that summary
judgment ruling in its notice of appeal. Id. See U.P.C. Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 990
P.2d 945. 951 (Utah 1999)(because U.P.C. Inc., "generally designated the final judgment
in its notice of appeal, [it is] not precluded from alleging errors in any intermediate order

2

The Court in Speros found that even if the appellant failed to accurately designate
the dates of the orders appealed, Nationwide did not, and cannot argue that it suffered any
such prejudice. Likewise, in this case, the Defendant cannot argue any such prejudice;
and has in fact responded to the appeal of the partial summary judgment ruling.
5

involving the merits or necessarily affecting the judgment." Id. at 952, citing Zions First
National Bank, 931 P.2d 142, at 144 (Utah 1997). To hold otherwise would be unduly
harsh, does not further the underlying purpose of a notice of appeal and would be a direct
contradiction of our jurisprudence governing the right of appeal. Statutes giving the right
of appeal are to be liberally construed in the furtherance of justice. An interpretation that
will work as a forfeiture of that right, is not favored. Id at 952.
The Notice of Appeal in this case clearly designates "allpreceding and
interim orders" and the summary judgment ruling is an intermediate order involving the
merits of the case and affecting the final judgment reached. Therefore, the Defendant
received adequate notice that the ruling on partial summary judgment was being appealed;
and the Notice of Appeal is sufficient to convey jurisdiction to this Court.
II.

THE BAD FAITH CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN LEFT FOR
THE JURY; NOT DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The determination as to whether there is a "fairly debatable" defense under

the facts and circumstances is usually a question of law. Billings v. Union Bankers Inc.
Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996). However, when there are factual questions as to the
insurance company's good faith investigation into the facts, the matter should be left for
the jury to decide. Billings v. Union Bankers Inc. Co., 918 P.2d 461,466 (Utah 1996). In
the case of Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Inc. Co., 909 P.2d 1279 (Ut.App. 1996), where
the insured's claim was denied based on arson and misrepresentation, as in this case, the
question as to whether the denial of the insurance claim was "fairly debatable" at the time
6

or not, was a question of fact, for the jury to decide. Id. at 1282.
In this case there were numerous factual questions presented on the motions
for summary judgment (Rec. 422-508), regarding the actions of the Insurance Company,
its investigation, and its denial based on arson.3
For example, the insurance investigator, Mr. Bebee testified he thought the
fire was intentionally set because no one was home at the time; however, he did not talk
to the boys who were in the home that night. (Rec. 1304, p. 101). The Plaintiff never
told him she was at the home late at night or early in the morning on July 26th, the day of
the fire. She told him that she was there late at night on the 24th of July; and had spent the
day before the fire, July 25th in Salt Lake City. (Rec. 1304, p. 35-36). There were no
eyewitnesses claiming Leigh was at the home the night of the fire. The written statement
from Steve Johnson (admitted into evidence as Ex. 25), does not say that he saw Leigh or
Doug there, only a Ford Ranger. (Rec. 1150-1151, Trial Ex. 25). If Mr. Bebee would
have talked to the boys, he would have learned that Chad Smith, who also drove a Ford
Ranger, was at the house that night and early the next morning, with Tim and his friends.
(Rec. 1305, p. 152). Mr. Bebee did not fully investigate these facts.

3

See Nature of Proceedings and Statement of Facts in Appellant's opening brief.
Defendant in footnotes argues that Points I, VI, VII and VIII should be stricken for failure
to cite to the record under Rule 24(a)(9) U.R.App.P. However, Plaintiff did cite to the
record in her brief, in the Statement of the Case, Nature of Proceedings, Statement of
Facts, and referred to them in her Argument when appropriate without restating all the
facts. If strict compliance of the rules are enforced, Appellee's footnotes should be
stricken, because they are not 13-point or larger, as required by Rule 27(b).
7

Sandy Fire Marshall Richard Lyman was also made aware that the boys
were in the home the night of the fire, but he did not bother to talk to them in preparing
his report. (Rec. 1305, p. 231). His report, upon which the Insurance Company relied,
states that it could change upon further information. (Rec. 1305, p. 232). Mr. Lyman
said that the boys being there that night could change his opinion in his report. (Rec.
1305, p. 232) When questioned about how this would change his opinion at trial, the
court would not allow, Plaintiffs counsel to proceed with such questions. (Rec. 1305, p.
236). Mr. Lyman indicated that there was no source of ignition in the middle of the room
and then states in the same report that the accelerant dog hit on an object in the middle of
the room. (Rec. 1305, p. 228). If he would have talked to the boys he would have learned
that they were there that night and had numerous appliances in the middle of the room,
including a T.V., a VCR, video game, and even had a candle lit, all on a pine table located
in the middle of the room. (Rec. 1305, p. 150-151). Mr. Lyman also testified that it was
a flashover fire and could have started in a mattress located in the room. (Rec. 1305, p.
224). If Mr. Lyman would have talked to the boys, he would have learned that they were
there drinking, lighting candles, and smoking on the mattresses. (Rec. 1305, p. 137).
John Blundell the insurance investigator (deceased before trial) did not talk
to the boys that were there that night. (Rec. 1305, p. 155). The statements he made in his
report are hearsay, and were objected to and inadmissible, for purposes of summary
judgment. (Rec. 523, fs j , k & 1). Detective Berhow did not talk to the boys and did not
testify at trial The statements made by Detective Berhow regarding what Richard Ricci or
8

John Remington may have said are hearsay, and were objected to and inadmissible for
purposes of summary judgment. (Rec. 523, fs j , k & 1).
There was no direct evidence that the fire was started or arranged by the
Plaintiff, for the Insurance Company to deny coverage based on its arson exclusion. (Rec.
1305, p. 222). A jury could find that the denial based on arson constituted bad faith.4
This matter should not have been dismissed on summary judgment, but left for the jury to
decide. Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Inc. Co., 909 P.2d 1279 (Ut.App. 1996).
III.

PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE
OF LIABILITY AGAINST THE INSURANCE COMPANY.
The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract,

(2) performance, (3) breach of contract by the other party and (4) damages. Breach of
contract damages seek to place the party in the same economic position the party would
have been in, if the contract had not been breached. Bair v. Axiom Design L.L. C, 20 P.3d
388 (Utah 2001).
In this case, Plaintiff established that there was a contract (insurance
policy); there was performance by the Plaintiff (paying premiums and submitting claims);
there was a breach by the Insurance Company (denying her claims); and damages, (the
payment she should have received under the policy). Therefore, Plaintiff did establish a
prima facie case for breach of her insurance contract. Id.
4

The Insurance Company did not deny the claim because it wasn't an "accident"
under the policy, but relied on its exclusions for arson and fraud. (Rec. 1304; Ex. 16).
9

Since insurance policies are contracts for the payment of money for an
unexpected loss, Utah courts have held that the issuance of an insurance policy for the
loss, and the receipt of premiums on the policy, establishes the, prima facie liability of the
insurance company. Fox v. Allstate Insurance Co., 453 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah 1969);
Peterson v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 425 P.2d 769 (Utah 1976).
The case of Fox v. Allstate Insurance Co. is on point in this case, as the
insured filed a claim for the loss of his boat. The insured claimed that the boat struck a
submerged object in Utah Lake and sank. The insurance company did a search of the
entire area, but found no signs of the sunken craft. The court found that the insured had
met his prima facie case against the insurance company, by the issuance of the insurance
policy and the payment of premiums. Id at 706. The insured was not required to produce
expert testimony regarding the loss of his boat; and the question as to whether he even
owned a boat or lost it at all, was left for the jury's determination. A motion for a
directed verdict could not be properly granted. Id at 704.
The Plaintiff in this case, therefore, did establish & prima facie case of
liability against the Insurance Company (without expert testimony), through her testimony
and the Insurance Company's admission that the policy was purchased, the premiums
paid, and the policy was in effect on the day of the fire.5 (Rec. 1304, p.23). Id. at 706.

5

Defendant complains that this shouldn't automatically entitled the insured to
payment under the policy. However, it doesn't. It only establishes the prima facie
liability of the insurance company. The insurance company still has all of its exclusions
10

IV.

THE PLAINTIFF DID PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THE
FIRE WAS "ACCIDENTAL" FOR COVERAGE UNDER
HER INSURANCE POLICY.
The trial court granted Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, stating

that there was no evidence presented by Plaintiffs expert that the fire was "accidental".
The trial court made this statement without attempting to define what constitutes
"accidental" under an insurance contract. The Policy at issue in this case provides, "[w]e
insure for accidental direct physical loss to property described in Coverage C, but only if
caused by one or more of the following perils: 1. Fire or lightning

" (Rec. 220).

There is no definition of the term "accidental" in the Policy.
Although the courts construe insurance contracts using the same
interpretive tools used to review contracts generally, they have frequently declared that
because insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, they are to be "construed liberally
in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries, so as to promote and not defeat, the
purposes of insurance." U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993).
Liberal construction should be given in favor of the insured to accomplish the purpose for
which the insurance was obtained and for which the premium was paid. Id. at 522. The
insured is entitled to the broadest coverage or protection that he could reasonably believe
was afforded under the policy.6 Id. at 522. If an insurance contract has inconsistent
and other defenses that can still be raised.
6

It is not a reasonable belief, that an insured would be required to hire an expert to
prove the cause and origin of a fire before establishing a prima facie case for liability on
11

provisions, one which can be construed against coverage and one which can be construed
in favor of coverage, the contract should be construed in favor of coverage.7 Id. at 523.
Furthermore, where exceptions are introduced into an insurance contract, a
general presumption arises to the effect that that which is not clearly excluded from the
operation of such contract is included in the operation thereof.8 IDS Hospital, Division of
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988).
In Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 200 P. 1017 (Utah 1921)
the Utah Supreme Court first laid down the standard for defining the words "accident" or
"accidental" as used in an insurance policy, stating "the word is descriptive of means
which produce effects, which are not their natural and probable consequences." Id. at
1023. The Court also defined the phrase "natural and probable consequence," stating:
The natural and probable consequence of means used [is] the consequence which
ordinarily follows from their use - the result which may be reasonably anticipated
from their use, and which ought to be expected. Id.

his insurance policy.
7

The trial court's definition of "accidental" in this case, is even more restrictive
than the exclusion for arson, as the arson exclusion only applies if it is the insured who
intentionally sets or arranges for the fire. (Rec. 1304). In other words, if someone other
than the insured intentionally sets fire to the home, the insured may still be able to recover
despite the arson exclusion, Error v. Western Home Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Utah
1988); but that person would never be able to recover, because he would be unable to
establish that the fire was "accidental" under the general terms of the policy.
8

Given the trial court's definition of "accidental" an insurance company will never
again have the burden of proving arson as an affirmative defense, as the insured will be
required to prove the fire was "accidental" under the general terms of the policy.
12

The Utah Supreme Court applied this definition in Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co.
of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983), stating: "thus, a person is a victim of an
accident, when from the victim's point of view, the occurrence causing the injury or
death is not a natural and probable result of the victim's own acts." (emphasis added)
Id. at 416.9 This is consistent with the accepted definition of "accidental" as used in
insurance contracts. Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition (Qualification of a particular
incident as an "accident" depends on two criteria: (1) The degree of foreseeabihty; and
(2) the state of mind of the actor in intending or not intending the result).
Therefore, the question as to whether the fire was "accidental" under the
insurance policy in this case, is not dependent on an expert testifying as to the cause or
origin of the fire; but rather, whether from the Plaintiffs point of view, the fire was
foreseeable as the natural and probable result of the Plaintiffs own actions . Hoffman v.
Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983); Fire Insurance Exchange v.
Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202, 1206 (Ut.App. 1997).10

9

Hoffman had been suicidal and was armed when shot by police. The trial court
ruled that his death was not accidental as a matter of law The Utah Supreme Court
however reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether his
death was intended or an accident, based on Hoffman's state of mind. Id. at 420-421.
10

In Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202, (Ut.App. 1997) the
Utah Court of Appeals indicated that an "accident" under an insurance policy may still
occur even if the injury is the result of an insured's deliberate or intentional act, if the
actual result is beyond the scope of anticipated injury. For instance, the scope of
anticipated injury is significantly greater when firing a shotgun or throwing a cherry
bomb, than throwing a water balloon. Id. at 1206.
13

In this case, the Plaintiff testified that she was not home at the time the fire
started, and that she had not been home the day before the fire started. (Rec. 1304, p. 3436). She stated that the last time she was at home before the fire, everything appeared to
be normal. (Rec. 1304, p. 25). She learned of the fire while at the Travelodge in Salt
Lake City, and it came as a total surprise. (Rec. 1304, p. 35-37). She did not know how
the fire started and asked how the fire started. (Rec. 1304, p. 38). Furthermore, she
contacted her insurance company and filed proof of claims for her damages. (Rec. 1304,
p. 41-43). According to her testimony, in her view the fire was accidental and she treated
the fire as accidental. She did not do anything from which the fire could have started as a
natural and probable result.11 Therefore, the Plaintiff (without expert testimony) did
present evidence that the fire was "accidental" under her insurance policy.
The case of Metric Const Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
2005 WL 21000939, (D. Utah 2005) is an unpublished decision, FOR EDUCATIONAL
USE ONLY, and thus has no precedential value and should not be used, except for the
purpose of applying the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.12
Regardless, the decision in Metric Const Co., supports Plaintiffs position that the
1

defendant argues that the Plaintiff never testified specifically that she didn't start
the fire, however, this is a reasonable inference from her actions and testimony; and on
Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict all inferences are to be viewed in Plaintiffs
favor. The question is whether any evidence was presented to the jury, no matter how
improbable. Alta Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCIMechanical Service, supra.
n

State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136 (Ut.App. 1991); DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co.,
835 P.2d 1000 (UtApp. 1992)
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determination of an "accident" under an insurance policy, depends on the insured's point
of view and the natural and foreseeable consequences from the insured's own actions. The
U.S. District Court in Metric Const. Co., found that the insured proceeded with the
installation of a defective roof, knowing that it would not be weather tight and doing
nothing to rectify the problem. Therefore, the Court found that the water leaking from the
roof, was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the insured's own actions, and not an
accident under the terms of his insurance policy.
The case of Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 371
n. 7, is not relevant to the facts in this case. The issue being addressed in footnote 7, was
whether the loss was discovered within the effective period of Aetna's bond. In this case,
there is no question but that the insurance policy was in effect at the time of the fire.
Finally, the case of Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279
(Ut.App. 1996), cited by the Defendant, actually supports Plaintiffs position. In Horrell
the insured's claim was denied based on arson and misrepresentation, similar to the
Plaintiffs claims in this case. The Utah Court of Appeals in Horrell did not require the
insured to prove the fire was "accidental" through the testimony of a cause and origin
expert; but rather stated, that the burden of proving arson was on the insurance company,
and not the insured. Id. at 1281.
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V.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT REQUIRED TO RAISE AN
ISSUE OF FACT REGARDING THE CAUSE OF A FIRE.
The trial court granted the Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict stating

that the Plaintiff by reserving her cause and origin expert for rebuttal, failed to put on any
evidence to show the fire was accidental. (Rec. 1210) As set forth above, the
determination as to whether a fire is "accidental" as defined under an insurance policy, is
based on the insured's point of view and whether the fire was foreseeable as a natural and
probable result of the insured's own actions. Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America,
669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983).
Regardless, when the cause and origin of a fire is at issue, the Utah Court of
Appeals has already held that expert testimony is not required to put on evidence to raise
a question of fact for a jury to decide whether the cause of a fire was accidental. The
Plaintiff cites two cases directly on point in her opening brief, which the Defendant fails
to address. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams, 2006 P.3d (2006 Ut. App. 500); and
Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Ut.App. 2002).
In Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., the insured was not required to present any
evidence by expert testimony to raise issues of fact for the jury to decide the cause of a
fire, thus precluding summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals in Bear
River Mutual Inc. Co., held that even if the insurance company puts on expert testimony
that a fire was intentional; the insured is still not required put on expert testimony that the
fire was accidental, to raise any issue of fact for the jury. Id.
16

In Neely v. Bennett, the Court of Appeals specifically ruled that the failure
to use expert testimony regarding the cause of a fire, does not establish causation as a
matter of law, so as to allow a directed verdict against a party. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals stated that in determining the cause of a fire, a jury may elect to give no weight
at all to an expert's opinion. Id. citing Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982).
Therefore, the Plaintiff in this case, contrary to the trial court's ruling, was
not required to put on expert testimony that the fire was "accidental" either to present a
prima facie case of liability under the insurance policy; or to raise an issue of fact as to
the cause of the fire on the claim of arson. Id.
The Defendant has failed to cite any cases where expert testimony was
required for an insured to establish a prima facie case that a fire was "accidental" under
an insurance policy. The case of Walker v. Parrish Chemical Co., 914 P.2d 1157
(Ut.App.1996) does not support this position. In fact, Walker v. Parrish Chemical did not
involve the question of whether the fire was accidental under an insurance policy, but the
plaintiffs attempt to establish negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
Plaintiff in this case is not attempting to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or
establish the negligence of any party under tort law. Plaintiffs claim is contractual.
Plaintiff had a policy of insurance with the Defendant, who promised to pay for damages
caused by accidental means. If the Plaintiff was required to establish the negligence of
the party committing the fire before she could recover under her insurance policy this
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could have been written into the policy.13
Furthermore, the case of Walker v. Parrish Chemical supports Plaintiffs
position that expert testimony as to the cause of a fire is not required. The Court in
Walker states that it is a matter of common knowledge that fires of unknown origin often
occur. Professors Prosser and Keaton explain:
[T]here are many accidents which as a matter of common knowledge,
occur frequently.... A tumble downstairs, a fall in alighting from a standing bus or
street car, an ordinary slip and fall, a tire of an ordinary automobile which blows out, a
skidding car, a staph infection from an operation, or afire of unknown origin. Id.
Therefore, according to the Utah Court of Appeals in Walker v. Parrish
Chemical, as well as Professors Prosser and Keaton, a fire of unknown origin is a matter
of common knowledge.
The case of King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992)
is even more distinguishable. It is also a res ipsa loquitur attempt to establish
negligence, but in the medical field. The plaintiff in King v. Searle was attempting to
establish negligence and the medical causation of her injuries from the implementation of
a intrauterine device (IUD). The court found that her claimed medical injuries and the
medical standard of care, were beyond the common knowledge of the jury, so she could

13

It should be remembered that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and
should be given their broadest interpretation to extend coverage to the insured and fulfill
its intended purpose. The requirement that in order to recover under an insurance policy,
the insured must first prove the negligence of the person responsible, is contrary to the
reason most people purchase insurance; and there would be no purpose for insurance,
since recovery would first have to be sought against the negligent party responsible.
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not rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The pharmaceutical company's liability
could not be deduced from common experience and knowledge. However, this case does
not involve a medical claim, medical causation, or the medical standard of care, requiring
expert testimony. Furthermore, even in medical malpractice claims expert testimony is
not always required.14
The case of Preston v. Chambers, P.C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260 (Ut.App.
1997) is also distinguishable from this case, as it does not involve the question as to
whether a fire is accidental under an insurance policy, but is a legal malpractice case.
Therefore, expert testimony was necessary in Preston v. Chambers to establish the
professional standard of care in the legal profession. There is no professional standard of
care at issue in this case, requiring expert testimony.
VI.

PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WAS PROPERLY DESIGNATED
AND SCHEDULED AS AN EXPERT WITNESS ON
PLAINTIFF'S CASE.
The Insurance Company claims that since Mr. King was to be used in

rebuttal of the testimony of the fire marshal and Defendant's fire expert that the Plaintiff
should be precluded from calling him as part of her case-in-chief, because it would be
prejudicial to the Defendant.
However, Mr. King was properly designated as an expert witness for
Plaintiffs case in chief. (See Plaintiffs Designation of Expert Witnesses, Rec. 58-59).
14

In Searle Pharmaceuticals, supra, the Court stated that medical claims could
proceed without expert testimony when the treatment received is within the common
knowledge of the laymen, such as when an instrument is left inside a patient.
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Furthermore, Mr. King's expert report was filed with the court and properly served on
Defendant's counsel (Rec. 63-73), indicating that all accidental causes of the fire were not
properly eliminated and the collapsed springs were a "classic indicator of a mattress fire."
(Rec. 68). It was after receiving Mr. King's report that Defendant designated its expert
witnesses. (Rec. 140). After receiving Mr. King's report and obtaining its own experts,
Defendant took Mr. King's deposition and had the opportunity to question him regarding
his report. (Rec. 166-167). Mr. King was designated as a witness on Plaintiffs case-inchief. There was no prejudice to the Defendant in allowing Mr. King to testify on
Plaintiffs case-in-chief.15
The Defendant argues that Plaintiff indicated that Mr. King was going to be
called as a rebuttal witness. This may be true, but Mr. King was also going to be called on
Plaintiffs case-in-chief. The fact Mr. King was also going to be used in rebuttal to the
Insurance Company's claim of arson; does not preclude himfromalso testifying on
Plaintiffs case-in-chief. Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1338 (Utah 1993). He should
have been permitted to testify before the ruling on directed verdict, especially when he
was properly designated as an expert witness on Plaintiffs case-in-chief.16

15

Defendant's real concern was that its expert, Mr. Freeman, would not be
available to testify until Friday; and the court made it clear on Wednesday, that
regardless, the case was going to finish on Thursday. (Rec. 1305, p. 252).
16

Even if he were only designated as a rebuttal witness (which he wasn't); the
Defendant elected to proceed and presented expert testimony to the jury through Richard
Lyman that the fire was intentional; therefore, Mr. King still had the right to testify in
rebuttal to Mr. Lyman's testimony. Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 (Ut.App. 1998).
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Moreover, both the Defendant and the trial court knew that Plaintiff
intended to call Mr. King before the close of Plaintiff s evidence. At the end of Mr.
Johnson's testimony, the court asked Plaintiff, subject to your last witness (being Mr.
King) do you rest? (Rec. 1305, p. 183). It was known that Mr. King was going to testify
before Plaintiff rested her case. Furthermore, asked if she rested, Plaintiffs counsel
informed the court that she still intended to call Mr. King before resting her case. (Rec.
1305, p. 252-253). In addition, the court told the Plaintiff and her counsel, that she would
be able to call Mr. King on her case-in-chief at noon on Thursday, November 30th. (Rec.
1305, p. 252-253). Plaintiff relied on this and had Mr. King ready to testify Thursday
morning before noon. The trial court abused its discretion and greatly prejudiced the
Plaintiff by not allowing her to call her expert to testify and close the evidence on her
case, before ruling on the Motion for Directed Verdict.17
VII.

THERE WAS EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE JURY
TO WITHSTAND A DIRECTED VERDICT.
On a motion for directed verdict the moving party has the very difficult

burden of showing that the party with the burden of proof has failed to raise any questions
of material fact, and the court should deny the motion, when any evidence exists raising
such a question, "no matter how improbable the evidence may appear." Alta Health
Strategies, Inc., v. CCIMechanical Serv., 930 P.2d 284 (Ut.App. 1996)(emphasis added).

17

The expert report of Mr. King was filed with the court and is part of the record.
He would have testified that not all accidental sources of the fire were properly eliminated
and it appeared to be a classic mattress fire. (Rec. 63-73).
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On a motion for directed verdict the court is not to weigh the evidence or
determine its probability, but it is only to determine if some evidence exists to create a
material issue of fact. The trial court in its ruling on directed verdict did not address all
the evidence that was presented to the jury by the Plaintiff, her witnesses, the crossexamination of the Defendant's witnesses, or the documents that were admitted into
evidence by stipulation.18 (Rec. 1150-1151).
For instance, the Plaintiff testified that she was not involved in the cause or
the fire. She did not set it, arrange for it, or know that it was going to happen. It came as
a complete surprise. (Rec. 1304, p. 35-36). Tim and his friend Brandon, where in the
home that night and early morning, without Plaintiffs knowledge or permission, drinking
alcohol, lighting candles, smoking on the mattresses, and playing video games, and
watching TV, on appliances that were placed in the middle of the room on a pine table.
(Rec. 1305, p.137; 150-151); and they were there with Chad Smith, who drove over in a
goldish looking Ford Ranger, similar to Doug Young's. (Rec. 1305, p. 155). Electrician
Chris Johnson testified that after the fire he observed burned wires in an electrical outlet,
contrary to the pictures and reports prepared by Lyman and Blundell (Rec. 1305, p. 182).
Mr. Lyman, the Sandy Fire Marshall, testified that his report was not complete, and that
he never talked to the boys, that were there at the house that night, although new
information would change his opinion on the cause of the fire. (Rec. 1305, p. 232). He

18

A11 evidence presented to the jury is to be considered on a motion for directed
verdict. State v. Stockton, 310 P.2d 398 (Utah 1957).
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also testified that the sagging mattress springs indicated a lot of heat and that this could
have been a cause of the fire. (Rec. 1305, p. 224). Mr. Lyman indicated that there was no
legitimate source of ignition in the middle of the room, where he believed the fire started,
but yet identified some debris in the middle of the room the dog hit on, that he first
thought was an auto part, then a computer part, or possibly a television part. (Rec. 1305,
p. 225-228). Mr. Nelson, the dog handler, testified that the dog hit on some debirs in the
northeast part of the room and they had to dig down to reach the debris.(Rec.l305, p.247).
The lab reportfromBarker & Herbert indicates that the turpentine residue is naturally
found in coniferous wood (such as pine) and can contaminate nearby objects when
coniferous wood is burned. (Rec. 355).
The trial court makes no indication that it even considered such evidence as
to whether an issue of fact was presented, but simply states that Plaintiff failed to put on
evidence that the fire was accidental, by reserving her cause and origin expert for rebuttal.
Given all the evidence presented in this case regarding the cause of the fire,
as set forth above, and in Plaintiffs Statement of the Facts in her brief; numerous factual
questions were presented to the jury, precluding a directed verdict.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE
PURSUANT TO RULE 41(b) WHICH DOES NOT APPLY
TO JURY TRIALS, BUT TO BENCH TRIALS.
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs case in the middle of a jury trial, relying
on Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rec 1201). Rule 41(b) applies only
to bench trials, not jury trials. Rule 41(b) should not be used injury trials and should not
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be confused with a motion for directed verdict. Grossen v. DeWitt, 982 P.2d 581
(Ut.App. 1999). Under Rule 41(b) the trial court may not usurp the jury's fact-finding
role. Id.
The court did not just erroneously refer to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure by stating that expert testimony was needed to prove the fire was
accidental, without considering the other evidence presented to the jury. It is evident
from this statement that the court was weighing the evidence and applying Rule 41(b)
which gives the court greater discretion in considering the evidence19. As the trial court
did in this case, under Rule 41(b), the court may dismiss a trial without a jury, if "(1) the
claimant has failed to introduce evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case or (2)
the trial court is not persuaded by that evidence." Walker v. Union Pac. R.R, 844 P.2d
335, 338 n. 1 (Ut.App. 1993) (emphasis added). The trial court improperly dismissed the
jury trial in this case, using a Rule 41(b) standard. Aha Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCI
Mechanical Service, 930 P.2d 280, 284 (Ut.App. 1997).
CONCLUSION
The question as to whether the fire was "accidental" under the insurance
policy in this case, is not dependent on an expert testifying as to the cause or origin of the
fire; but rather, whether from the Plaintiffs point of view, the fire was foreseeable as the
natural and probable result of the Plaintiffs own actions . Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of

19

It is the substance of a motion that is dispositive in determining the character of
the motion. Adoption of Baby K, 967 P.2d 947, 948 n. 1 (Ut.App. 1998).
24

North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983); Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930
P.2d 1202, 1206 (Ut.App. 1997). Therefore, expert testimony was not needed for the
Plaintiff to present evidence that the fire was "accidental" under the insurance policy.
Furthermore, even when the cause and origin of a fire is at issue in a case,
expert testimony is still not required to raise an issue of fact for the jury to determine
whether the cause of a fire was accidental. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams, 2006
P.3d (2006 Ut. App. 500); and Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Ut.App. 2002). The
Plaintiff did establish a prima facie case against the Insurance Company in this case
without the need of expert testimony; and did present evidence to raise an issue of fact for
the jury, precluding a directed verdict.
Moreover, the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled on Defendant's
Motion for Directed Verdict without allowing Plaintiffs expert to testify, when he was
properly designated as an expert for Plaintiffs case-in-chief, when Plaintiff had indicated
that she intended to call him before resting her case, and when the court earlier agreed to
allow Mr. King to testify the next day, before the close of Plaintiff s evidence.
Finally, the trial court improperly dismissed the jury trial by applying Rule
41(b), in weighing the evidence and determining that is was insufficient without expert
testimony, to present any evidence to the jury that the fire was accidental.
The trial court's ruling on partial summary judgment and the Directed
Verdict should both be set aside; and the case remanded back for a trial on these issues.
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DATED this Z2^ day of October, 2007.
BOND & CALL L.C.
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